SCOTUS's August 17th order for a federal district court in Georgia to hear evidence not included in the
original criminal trial of Troy Davis is extraordinarily rare. Davis's legal team submitted an original writ of habeas corpus on his behalf with the Supreme Court. This type of motion essentially is a request of the High Court to inquire into the legitimacy of Davis's conviction and subsequent death row sentence. It has been almost 50 years since such a motion has been granted by SCOTUS. Also of note, the Court came back for a special session about 3 weeks early in order to rule on this motion.
The evidence includes seven recanted statements by prosecution witnesses, several witness affidavits implicating someone else as the shooter, and at least four jurors from his trial have issued official statements that they would not have found him guilty had this new evidence been known at the time of trial. Also worthy of note, the prosecutions star witness is also the the man being implicated by at least seven of the other witnesses who have recanted. Of course, he hasn't recanted. Furthermore, there were consistent reports of police coercion of the witnesses when they gave their original statements.
Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented stating that they found the new evidence "lacking" and "stale". In his dissent, J. Scalia points out that every judicial and executive body in the state of Georgia that heard the appeal has found Davis's claim without merit.
Also at issue is jurisdiction and the question of whether a federal district court will have the ability adjudicate an "actual innocence" claim after Davis's motions to consider the new evidence were denied by every state appeals body in Georgia. Justice Scalia, in his dissent, opined that if there were indeed genuine material issues brought forth in Davis's new evidence, the High Court should decide rather than a district court. In fact, he refers to the Court's order to transfer the review to the District Court as "a confusing exercise that can serve no purpose but to delay the State's execution of its lawful criminal judgment." The High Court has never ruled on an actual claim of innocence in a state conviction.
J. Scalia further notes that the original trial of Troy Davis was "untainted by constitutional defect" and, therefore, the resulting decision must stand. Mainly, the dissent presents two issues: first, that this new evidence has already been overwhelmingly rejected by three different Georgia state tribunals - one of which - the GA Board of Pardons and Paroles - permitted Davis to submit addendums in addition to the new evidence; spent a year investigating the merits of the new evidence and examining police reports and other evidence; and still came back with a denial.
Secondly, the dissent argues that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1966 (AEDPA) bars the ability of a District court to order the release of a state prisoner unless the preceding state trial or appeals decisions were unconstitutional as determined by SCOTUS precedent. Scalia argues that since SCOTUS has never decided the constitutionality of the AEDPA in claims of actual innocence, and since Davis's writ of habeas corpus does not include such a claim, the District court will have no power to adjudicate such a claim and, in fact, the District court's role on this SCOTUS motion is unclear. If the issue were the unconstitutionality of the Act on an actual innocence claim, it would clearly require adjudication in the High Court according to Scalia.
Justice Stevens, in his opinion, argues that the issue of whether the AEDPA includes a bar on actual innocence claims and the constitutionality of such an interpretation has already been considered in federal court. He further cites the notion that the statute is unconstitutional in the actual innocence claim from Davis's original writ in illustrating why such an evidentiary hearing must take place. To be sure, there is very little precedent to rely on in this issue. Nevertheless, the Court's opinion asserts that capital defendants with an actual innocence claim that is as sound as the claim Davis has submitted must be afforded full constitutional rights to due process.
In response to the dissent, J. Stevens allows that where the AEDPA is used in an actual innocence claim, the application of it would still be unconstitutional given that it would bar relief for a death row inmate who has established his innocence. This implies that the verdict and sentencing in the original trial would not have been reached had the new evidence been available at the time of conviction which could safely raise the constitutionality question. In fact, J. Stevens points out that executing an innocent man would be the height of unconstitutionality which would allow AEDPA to be invoked in an actual innocence claim and applied in favor of Davis. Put another way, whether the District court chooses to apply the statute or not, AEDPA can be applied in favor of Davis or it can bar his claim and still be examined for it's constitutionality. The opinion establishes that the legal theories at question should not allow an execution order to stand when there are so many unresolved nuances.
I do appreciate J. Scalia's point of view to the extent that the AEDPA could pose a problem for the District court's ability to adjudicate Davis's claim. If the court interprets ridgidly, this will not bode well for Davis. The district court will have to be willing to examine alternative interpretations and to interpret the statute liberally.
It would seem that the court to could reason that a) AEDPA does apply to actual innocence claims but the act does not allow the federal court to overturn the conviction on the grounds that his conviction was unconstitutional b) that the AEDPA does not apply to actual innocence claims, and therefore, the court is not bound by it's constrictions to adjudicate this claim or c) that AEDPA does apply to actual innocence claims, yet Davis's conviction and subsequent appeal denials were not unconstitutional.
A recent SLATE article
Not Innocent Enough highlights the problem of the absence of the High Court's adjudication of actual innocence claims for convicted death row inmates. To be sure, Scalia clearly stated in the Davis dissent, "this court has
never held that the Constitution forbids the execution of a convicted defendant who has had a full and fair trial but is later able to convince a habeas court that he is 'actually innocent'." He's telling the truth. Should that mean that this Court should never review their position on such claims? Clearly, as evidenced in the Slate article, there is a need now that there is incontrovertible proof that an innocent man was put to death in Texas in 2004 (
Cameron Todd Willingham).
It does make me wonder; however, if questions on the constitutionality of AEDPA on an actual innocence claim were clearly going to arise, why the High Court didn't choose to review the evidence itself in anticipation of deciding the constitutionality issue? In this sentiment, I agree with Scalia....what role does the High Court expect the District court to play? The Supreme Court should assess the constitutionality of a state executing a convicted defendant who has had a full and fair trial when that defendant can show meritorious evidence of his own innocence after the conviction. I wanted to write so much more about this case and the support that Davis has received but just explaining the most recent developments made this post unbearably long. I'll do that in a separate post.
This man has been on death row for 18 years. His case is known around the world. SCOTUS is aware that the world is watching and waiting. This is a social policy issue, a Congressional issue, and a Constitutional issue. So much will result from the final decision in this case. Stay tuned.